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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal antidiscrimination statutes generally ban adverse employment 
actions taken “because of” certain specified traits or characteristics. Under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, for example, an employer is prohibited from 
discriminating “because of” an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”1 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
* Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law 
School.  
 J.D. 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate, Best & Flanagan LLP, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2000).  
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uses similar language in banning discrimination “against any individual . . . 
because of such individual’s age.”2 And, while the antidiscrimination formula 
utilized by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is more 
complicated than either Title VII or the ADEA, it too prohibits discrimination 
“against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”3 
As the Supreme Court has stated, “The ultimate question in every 
employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is 
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”4 The 
antidiscrimination prohibition contained in each of these three statutes, 
however, extends only to actions undertaken by an “employer” and “any 
agents” of an employer.5 Thus, liability hinges upon the showing of a causal 
connection between some discriminatory action attributable to a statutory 
employer and some adverse employment action suffered by an employee.6 
This connection is most easily established when a sole proprietor 
discriminates by discharging or otherwise taking some adverse action with 
respect to a rank-and-file employee. More typically, in a corporate 
organizational structure, a plaintiff may establish a statutory violation by 
showing that a supervisor has used his or her delegated authority to alter an 
employee’s terms and conditions of employment because of the employee’s 
protected class status.7 In both contexts, the necessary causal nexus is present 
because the employer or the agent harboring the discriminatory intent also is the 
party who effectuates the resulting adverse employment action.  
                                                                                                                                 
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
3. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (to be codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is more complicated in 
two significant respects. First, only individuals who have a qualifying “disability” have standing to 
assert a claim under the ADA. See id. Second, in ascertaining whether an employer is 
discriminating under the ADA, the statute asks whether the employee is qualified for the job “with 
or without reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); see also Stephen F. Befort 
& Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s 
Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69–70 (1999). 
4. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).  
5. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII 
definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA’s definition of “employer”). Title VII 
and the ADA define covered employers as entities employing fifteen or more employees. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII definition of covered employers); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA 
definition of covered employers). The ADEA covers employers with twenty or more employees. 
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA definition of covered employers). 
6. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272–73 (2001) (per curiam). 
7. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“[A] tangible 
employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the 
employer.”); see also Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 520–22 (2001) 
(explaining the Supreme Court’s decision in Ellerth).  
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But what if these two attributes, although both present in the workplace, do 
not coalesce in the same individual? That is the conundrum presented in 
subordinate bias litigation. The typical scenario presenting the issue of 
subordinate bias liability consists of a frontline supervisor or other employee 
who harbors a discriminatory animus toward a protected group or trait. The 
supervisor does not possess authority to implement adverse employment actions 
against the target employee, but instead influences those with decision making 
authority by making unfavorable recommendations or by falsifying records. 
Someone on a higher rung of the human resources ladder, who does have 
authority to make concrete decisions about terms and conditions of 
employment, then relies on the information. In this setting, although the adverse 
employment action is not made directly by someone acting with a conscious 
intent to discriminate, the bias of the lower level supervisor taints the decision 
making process.8 
Judge Posner, in Shager v. Upjohn Co.,9 coined the term “cat’s paw” 
liability to refer to employer liability resulting from subordinate bias. The term 
derives from the fable of the monkey and the cat by Jean de La Fontaine.10 The 
fable tells the tale of a conniving monkey that wants to eat chestnuts roasting in 
a fire.11 The monkey is unwilling to burn himself to get the chestnuts, and 
instead convinces a cat to do his bidding.12 As the cat repeatedly burns its paws 
retrieving the chestnuts from the fire, the monkey sits back unharmed, 
devouring the chestnuts.13 The modern connotation of “cat’s-paw” refers to 
“one used by another to accomplish his purposes.”14 In the employment context, 
the monkey represents the biased subordinate, while the cat represents the 
employer who acts as the conduit to commit discriminatory adverse actions 
against the victimized employee.15  
Since 1990, every federal circuit court of appeals,16 as well as the Supreme 
Court,17 have endorsed the notion that subordinate bias may be a basis for 
imputing liability to an employer in appropriate circumstances. The problem is 
                                                                                                                                 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 23–38. 
9. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
10. See THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE (Elizur Wright trans., 1882). 
11. See EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 
2006) (describing the La Fontaine’s fable), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (citing THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 344). 
14. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 354 (2002). 
15. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484. 
16. See Ali Razzaghi, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.: “Substantially 
Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change Its Standard for Imputing Employer Liability for the 
Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1709, 1715–23 (2005) (explaining the 
different holdings of the circuit courts of appeals with respect to subordinate bias liability). 
17. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152–54 (2000).  
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that no agreement exists as to just what set of circumstances are appropriate for 
such an outcome. The majority of circuit courts have adopted a relatively 
lenient standard which imposes liability whenever a biased subordinate 
influences an adverse action made by an ultimate decisionmaker.18  
More recently, three circuits have raised the bar for finding subordinate bias 
liability. The strictest standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit, limits liability to 
the situation in which the biased subordinate is the de facto actual or principal 
decisionmaker.19 Two other circuits have adopted intermediate approaches that 
focus more closely on causation and on whether the employer has undertaken an 
independent investigation into the underlying circumstances.20 In taking review 
of one of the decisions espousing an intermediate approach, it appeared for a 
while that the Supreme Court might provide some answers as to the scope of 
subordinate bias liability.21 But, those hopes were dashed in 2007 when the 
parties settled the underlying action, and the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal.22  
This Article attempts to fill this gap by suggesting the appropriate contours 
for determining the reach of subordinate bias liability. Part II reviews the 
origins of the cat’s paw theory in the Shager decision and in the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. decision. Part 
III lays out the competing standards established by the circuit courts of appeals. 
Part IV then analyzes three crucial issues that inform the policy bases for 
subordinate bias liability: (1) What is the appropriate causation standard 
regarding the impact of the biased subordinate’s conduct?; (2) When is the 
subordinate’s discriminatory bias properly attributable to the employer in terms 
of agency principles?; and (3) What should be the impact of an employer’s 
investigation into the underlying circumstances? Finally, in Part V, rather than 
endorsing any of the existing standards recognized by the courts of appeals, the 
Article proposes a new test that draws on the various strengths of the current 
formulations. Under this test, a plaintiff should be recognized as making out a 
prima facie case of subordinate bias liability by showing that a supervisor, or 
other employee with delegated authority, influenced an adverse employment 
action to the extent that discrimination was a motivating factor in that outcome. 
Once an employee makes such a showing, an employer should be liable unless 
it can establish the existence of either of two affirmative defenses. First, 
                                                                                                                                 
18. See infra Part III.A. 
19. See infra Part III.B. 
20. See infra Part III.C. 
21. See BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angles v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007) 
(granting certiorari to the United States Supreme Court). 
22. See BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007) 
(dismissing certiorari to the United States Supreme Court). 
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borrowing from sexual harassment jurisprudence, an employer should not be 
liable where it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and correct such bias—
for instance, by implementing an anti-bias policy—and the plaintiff 
unreasonably has failed to use the opportunities provided. Second, where the 
plaintiff has utilized such a policy or where no policy exists, an employer 
should be able to avoid liability only if it has dissipated the taint of subordinate 
bias by undertaking a fair and independent investigation into the circumstances 
underlying the contemplated employment action. This new test would 
encourage employers to protect themselves by preventing discrimination in the 
workplace while still providing plaintiffs with a reasonable opportunity to 
obtain redress for such discrimination that nonetheless may occur.  
II. THE ORIGINS OF SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1990, first addressed the issue of 
cat’s paw liability in Shager v. Upjohn Co.23 Shager worked as a sales 
representative for a seed company.24 At the time of his termination, Shager was 
fifty-three years of age and reported to Lehnst, a thirty-eight-year-old district 
manager.25 Lehnst manipulated Shager’s sales territory and then placed him on 
probation for alleged performance deficiencies.26 Eventually, Lehnst 
recommended to the employer’s “‘Career Path Committee,’ which reviews 
personnel actions,” that Shager be fired, and the committee concurred.27 Shager 
sued under the ADEA claiming age discrimination, but the district court granted 
the employer’s motion for summary judgment.28  
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, provided a primer on 
employment discrimination basics.29 After reviewing basic agency principles, 
Judge Posner opined that if supervisor Lehnst had directly fired Shager due to 
age-related animus, the employer would be liable regardless of whether anyone 
else connected with the company shared that particular viewpoint.30 But, Judge 
Posner added: 
Lehnst did not fire Shager; the Career Path Committee did. If it did so 
for reasons untainted by any prejudice of Lehnst’s against older 
workers, the causal link between that prejudice and Shager’s discharge 
                                                                                                                                 
23. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). 
24. Id. at 399. 
25. See id. at 399–400. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 400. 
28. Id. at 399. 
29. See id. at 400–02. 
30. Id. at 404–05. 
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is severed, and Shager cannot maintain this suit even if [the employer] 
is fully liable for Lehnst’s wrongdoing. But if Shager’s evidence is 
believed, as in the present posture of the case it must be, the 
committee’s decision to fire him was tainted by Lehnst’s prejudice. . . . 
If it acted as the conduit of Lehnst’s prejudice—his cat’s-paw—the 
innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability.31 
Finding this to be an unanswered question of fact, the Seventh Circuit reversed 
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded.32 
The Supreme Court, eight years later, endorsed the general concept of 
subordinate bias liability in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.33 In 
Reeves, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that the official 
decisionmaker held any discriminatory animus.34 Instead, the plaintiff presented 
evidence that a supervisor, who was also the official decisionmaker’s husband, 
harbored discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff because of the latter’s 
age.35 The Supreme Court held that the absence of a discriminatory intent on 
the part of the official decisionmaker did not mandate judgment as a matter of 
law for the defendant because the plaintiff had provided evidence that one of the 
plaintiff’s superiors “was motivated by age-based animus and was principally 
responsible for petitioner’s firing.”36 Under the circumstances, the Court found 
that the supervisor was the “actual decisionmaker” behind the firing,37 and that 
his actions were sufficient to support a jury verdict finding the employer liable 
for age discrimination.38 
While the Supreme Court in Reeves recognized subordinate bias liability in 
principle, the Court did not discuss the range of circumstances under which 
such liability would ensue.39 As a result, the task of determining the contours of 
subordinate bias liability has been left to the circuit courts of appeals. As the 
next section demonstrates, this has led to a plethora of competing standards.  
                                                                                                                                 
31. Id.(citations omitted). 
32. Id. at 406. 
33. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
34. See id. at 146. 
35. Id. at 151–52. 
36. Id. at 152. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 153–54.  
39. See, e.g., White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 497 (“But Reeves, we believe, is best read as 
not confronting directly the difficult question of how to determine whether discriminatory intent is 
present in cases where multiple actors are involved in the decision making process.”). 
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III. CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT POSITIONS 
The circuit courts of appeals have adopted a diversity of positions with 
respect to subordinate bias liability, and it would be most accurate to see these 
positions as falling along a widely arching continuum. For purposes of 
discussion and analysis, however, we describe these viewpoints using three 
basic categories: lenient, intermediate, and strict. Despite the considerable 
variations in the tests articulated in individual decisions, the cases within each 
of these three groupings share a similarity in underlying theory and operative 
criteria. In addition, the order in which these three categories are presented 
reflect the order of chronological development.  
A. The Lenient Standard 
The majority of circuits employ a lenient standard in determining the 
existence of subordinate bias liability. This approach, adopted in the vast 
majority of decisions issued prior to 2005, sets a relatively low threshold that a 
plaintiff must satisfy in order to avoid summary judgment, and, ultimately, in 
order to establish grounds for employer liability. Under this standard, 
“[S]ummary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that 
an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other 
input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”40 Courts that 
follow this approach generally believe that discrimination on any level of the 
decision making process has the ability to influence the ultimate decisionmaker 
and thus constitutes a reasonable basis for imposing liability.41  
Most courts adhering to the lenient standard require that the biased 
subordinate exercise some degree of “influence” over the ultimate employment 
decision at issue.42 A typical example is the First Circuit’s decision in 
Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.43 In that case, the plaintiff, 
Santiago–Ramos, was a high-level female executive for Centennial who was 
married with one child and working with all male counterparts.44 Santiago–
Ramos’s supervisor, Rivera, made several comments to Santiago–Ramos, which 
were direct evidence of sex-based discrimination.45 In determining whether 
                                                                                                                                 
40. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994). 
41. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t 
plainly is permissible for a jury to conclude that an evaluation at any level, if based on 
discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking process and thus allowed discrimination to infect 
the ultimate decision.” (citing Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
42. See infra text accompanying notes 46–54. 
43. 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000). 
44. Id. at 50. 
45. Id. at 50–51. 
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liability could be imposed on Centennial through the bias of Rivera, the court 
discussed Rivera’s “influence” on Mayberry, the formal decisionmaker:  
                                                                                                                                 
Santiago–Ramos can establish that Centennial’s stated reasons for her 
dismissal are a pretext for discrimination in a number of ways. One 
method is to show that discriminatory comments were made by the key 
decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the 
decisionmaker. . . . There is evidence that Mayberry, head of Puerto 
Rico operations for the parent company, was the key decisionmaker in 
the termination of Santiago–Ramos’ employment. It is also clear that 
Rivera, Santiago–Ramos’ direct supervisor and general manager in 
Puerto Rico, was in a position to influence Mayberry in that decision.46  
Not surprisingly, the decisions have described the amount of influence 
required in various terms, including: 
[E]vidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the ultimate 
decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate’s influence.47 
[T]he plaintiff must offer evidence that the supervisor’s racial animus 
was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the ultimate 
decisionmaker.48 
Consequently, it is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s 
age-based animus if the evidence indicates that the worker possessed 
leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker.49 
Young’s alleged statements to Rose . . . were comments made directly 
to her on more than one occasion by her immediate supervisor, who 
had enormous influence in the decision-making process.50 
Other decisions have focused more on the subordinate’s participation in the 
decisionmaking process: 
46. Id. at 55 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
47. Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
48. Christian v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
49. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
50. Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
2008] SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY 9 
Even if a manager was not the ultimate decisionmaker, that manager’s 
retaliatory motive may be imputed to the company if the manager was 
involved in the hiring decision.51  
Instead, this case involves a nondecisionmaker who was closely 
involved in the decisionmaking process . . . .52 
Based upon these facts, we conclude that a jury could reasonably find 
that [the store manager] played a significant role in [the district 
manager’s] decisionmaking process.53 
Our cases have noted that this situation may occur in an instance in 
which a subordinate, by concealing relevant information from the 
decisionmaker, is able to manipulate the decisionmaking process and to 
influence the decision.54 
The Third Circuit has summarized the lenient standard approach most 
accurately by stating that subordinate basis liability can be established when 
“those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the 
decision to terminate.”55 
The Eleventh Circuit has articulated a somewhat different approach in 
stating that it will find subordinate bias liability when the titular decisionmaker 
is a “mere conduit” for the subordinate’s discriminatory animus.56 Although one 
commentator has described the Eleventh Circuit as utilizing a variation of the 
lenient standard,57 the use of the term “conduit” seems to indicate a somewhat 
higher hurdle. Rather than simply asking whether a subordinate’s bias 
influenced an adverse decision, the conduit language suggests that the 
subordinate’s impact must substantially displace the decisionmaker’s exercise 
of discretion. Because the case law in the Eleventh Circuit is not well developed 
on this issue, the best we can do is to speculate that this circuit’s position 
remains uncertain.  
                                                                                                                                 
51. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 
1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
52. EEOC v. Liberal R–II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).  
53. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
54. Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis 
added). 
55. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added); see also Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
liability where a “biased subordinate influenced or was involved in the decision or decisionmaking 
process”).  
56. Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998). 
57. See Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1721–22. 
10 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:___ 
Thus, throughout the circuits that use the lenient standard, there is some 
variety as to the specific requirements needed to show that the subordinate 
possessed the requisite amount of influence on the adverse employment 
decision. However, what is clear—except perhaps in the Eleventh Circuit—is 
that a plaintiff need not show that the individual making the ultimate decision 
simply rubber-stamped the subordinate’s decision.58 Instead, the influence or 
taint of subordinate bias itself is sufficient to establish a causal link to employer 
liability. Similarly, the courts using the lenient standard do not look to agency 
principles in determining whether an employer should be liable for a decision 
tainted by subordinate bias. Courts using the lenient standard simply presume 
that if a subordinate’s influence is causally connected to an ultimate 
employment decision, then such decision must necessarily be attributable to the 
employer for purposes of liability. 
B. The Strict Standard 
In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.,59 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted a decidedly different approach to subordinate bias 
liability. The Fourth Circuit’s strict standard requires that the biased subordinate 
be the “actual decisionmaker” or the one “principally responsible” for the 
adverse employment decision in order to impute liability to the employer.60 The 
court in Hill explained that these requirements establish the outer limits for 
holding employers liable under the cat’s paw theory, a result that sets a very 
high benchmark for employees to meet.61  
Ethel Hill worked as an aircraft mechanic on a military base.62 She claimed 
that her supervisor, safety inspector Ed Fultz, harbored a discriminatory animus 
against her, as evidenced by demeaning comments concerning her age and 
gender, such as calling her a “troubled old lady,” a “useless old lady,” and “a 
damn woman.”63 Fultz reported Hill for various work rule infractions which 
eventually led Lockheed Martin’s East Coast senior site supervisor, Archie 
Griffin, to discharge Hill when she was fifty-seven years old.64 Hill brought suit 
claiming violations of Title VII and the ADEA, and the district court granted the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment, noting Griffin’s lack of 
discriminatory animus.65 A divided Fourth Circuit panel initially reversed, but 
                                                                                                                                 
58. See supra text accompanying notes 40–57. 
59. 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
60. Id. at 290. 
61. See id. at 289–91. 
62. Id. at 282. 
63. Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. Id. at 282–83. 
65. Id. at 282–83. 
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the court subsequently reheard the case en banc and, in a 7–4 decision, affirmed 
the district court.66 
The majority in Hill began by noting that agency principles govern 
employer liability under the two statutes.67 The court then reviewed three 
Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted the reach of these principles.68 
First, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,69 the Supreme Court had 
explained that “by defining employer” covered by Title VII to include “any 
agent,” Congress “‘evince[d] an intent to place some limits on the acts of 
employees for which employers . . . are to be held responsible.’”70 The Hill 
court then turned to Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,71 a case in which the 
Supreme Court considered the issue of an employer’s vicarious liability for the 
sexually harassing acts of a supervisor.72 In Ellerth, as well as in Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton,73 a companion case, the Supreme Court had ruled that 
employers are strictly liable where a supervisor inflicts harassment in the form 
of a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or termination.74 
According to the Hill majority, Ellerth “defined the limits of such agency as 
encompassing employer liability for the acts of its employees holding 
supervisory or other actual power to make tangible employment decisions.”75 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit discussed Reeves v. Sandiscon Plumbing Products, 
Inc.,76 noting that the biased subordinate in that case was the actual 
decisionmaker behind the plaintiff’s firing.77 The Hill majority summarized the 
import of Reeves in the following passage: 
In sum, Reeves informs us that the person allegedly acting pursuant to a 
discriminatory animus need not be the “formal decisionmaker” to 
impose liability upon an employer for an adverse employment action, 
so long as the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to establish that the 
                                                                                                                                 
66. Id. at 283. 
67. Id. at 286–87. 
68. Id. at 287–88. 
69. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
70. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (alterations in original) (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72). 
71. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
72. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763) (considering issue of vicarious 
liability for acts of supervisors). 
73. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65. 
75. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).  
76. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
77. Hill, 354 F.3d at 288–89 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152). 
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subordinate was the one “principally responsible” for, or the “actual 
decisionmaker” behind, the action.78  
The majority then turned its attention more specifically to the cat’s paw 
theory.79 Although citing Shager and Reeves favorably, the majority noted that 
other courts have not described the cat’s paw theory consistently, “and rarely 
have they done so after a discussion of the agency principles from which the 
theory emerged and that limit its application.”80 Applying agency principles, the 
Fourth Circuit found it inappropriate to impute liability to an employer where a 
biased subordinate, without supervisory or disciplinary authority, influences or 
plays a role in the adverse employment decision.81 Instead, the majority ruled 
that cat’s paw liability is appropriate only if a biased subordinate both (1) 
possesses “supervisory or disciplinary authority,”82 and (2) is “the one 
principally responsible for the [adverse] decision or the actual decisionmaker 
for the employer.”83 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Hill 
majority found that Fultz, the biased subordinate, merely initiated the decision 
making process that led to Hill’s termination, and thus did not meet the “actual 
decisionmaker” threshold necessary to impute liability to Lockheed Martin.84  
Judge Michael filed a spirited dissent in which he claimed that the 
majority’s decision renders Title VII and the ADEA “essentially toothless when 
it comes to protecting employees against unlawful employment decisions that 
are motivated by biased subordinates.”85 Judge Michael contended that the 
majority went astray in focusing primarily on principles of agency law, to the 
detriment of what he saw as the key causation issue.86 The dissent also took 
issue with the majority’s transformation of Ellerth and Reeves from simple 
examples of situations resulting in agency liability to the outer boundaries of 
such liability.87 In the end, the four dissenters endorsed the lenient standard, 
stating that “when a biased subordinate has substantial influence on an 
employment decision, the subordinate’s bias [should] be imputed to the formal 
decisionmaker.”88  
                                                                                                                                 
78. Id. (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151–52). 
79. Id. at 289. 
80. Id. at 290. 
81. See id. at 291. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 297. 
85. Id. at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. (“[The majority] overlooks the statutory focus on causation, that is, whether an 
adverse employment action was taken “because of” a protected trait such as sex or age.”). 
87. Id. at 302–04. 
88. Id. at 304. 
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As compared to the lenient standard, the Fourth Circuit’s strict approach 
places a greater reliance on agency principles. These principles, at least 
according to the Hill majority, make employers vicariously liable only for the 
actions of subordinates with supervisory or disciplinary authority. The strict 
standard also appears to utilize a but for model of causation. Under this 
approach, an employer is not legally responsible for subordinate bias that might 
play some motivating role in an adverse employment decision unless that 
subordinate’s role rises to the level of the employer’s de facto principal 
decisionmaker. The combination of these two requirements establishes a very 
high threshold for subordinate bias liability.  
C. The Intermediate Standards 
More recently, two circuits have charted intermediate courses. Both the 
Tenth and the Seventh Circuits have crafted standards that reject the Hill 
approach, yet require a greater showing of causation than does the lenient 
standard. While the views of the two circuits are not identical, both focus on 
issues of causation and the role of an employer’s independent investigation.  
In 2006, the Tenth Circuit forged a middle path in its EEOC v. BCI Coca–
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles89 decision. In that case, Stephen Peters, an 
African-American, was terminated from his position as a merchandiser at a New 
Mexico facility where more than 60% of the employees were Hispanic and less 
than 2% were African-American.90 The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) brought suit claiming BCI was liable for discriminatory 
discharge under Title VII through cat’s paw liability.91 The EEOC argued that 
Peters’s immediate supervisor, Grado, who was Hispanic, displayed 
discriminatory bias toward Peters and other African-American employees.92 
BCI argued that Grado was not involved in the termination process, and BCI, 
therefore, could not be liable under Title VII.93 Indeed, the termination decision 
was made by a manager, Edgar, who was not even aware of Peters’s race.94 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the employer, but the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed.95 
The Tenth Circuit initially reviewed the existing subordinate bias liability 
landscape.96 The court disagreed with the “any influence” analysis used by 
                                                                                                                                 
89. 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007).  
90. Id. at 478, 481. 
91. Id. at 482. 
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 483. 
94. Id. at 481. 
95. Id. at 483, 493. 
96. Id. at 484–88. 
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those circuits following the lenient standard, stating that “[s]uch a weak 
relationship between the subordinate’s actions and the ultimate employment 
decision improperly eliminates a requirement of causation.”97 But, the Tenth 
Circuit also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s more restrictive approach, contending 
that “agency law principles include[] not only ‘decisionmakers’ but other agents 
whose actions, aided by the agency relation, cause injury.”98 Having rejected 
these two alternatives, the Tenth Circuit set its own course, stating that the key 
issue in this context “is whether the biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports, 
recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action.”99 
The court also noted that this standard provides employers with an avenue to 
avoid liability.100 Because this standard requires a causal connection, an 
employer can prevent liability by showing a break in the causation chain.101 
Thus, an employer avoids liability “by conducting an independent investigation 
of the allegations against an employee.”102 The court suggested that “simply 
asking an employee for his version of events may [be sufficient to] defeat the 
inference that an employment decision was racially discriminatory.”103 In this 
case, because the manager relied exclusively on information provided by Grado 
and conducted no independent investigation beyond pulling Peters’s personnel 
file, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment.104 
The Seventh Circuit also initially voiced its disapproval of Hill in a 2004 
opinion.105 But, three years later in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois, 106 the Seventh Circuit took a turn in Hill’s direction. The 
court in Brewer reviewed its cat’s paw jurisprudence, noting that “our 
approach . . . has not always been completely clear.”107 Although the court 
admitted that some earlier opinions had suggested that “any influence” over an 
employment decision was sufficient to impose liability on an employer, it 
                                                                                                                                 
97. Id. at 486–87. 
98. Id. at 487. 
99. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
100. Id. at 488 (citing English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 
2001)). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (citing English, 248 F.3d at 1011). 
103. Id. (citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs. Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 
2000)). 
104. Id. at 493. 
105. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We are mindful that 
Hill . . . holds that a subordinate’s influence, even substantial influence, over the supervisor’s 
decision is not enough to impute the discriminatory motives of the subordinate to the supervisor; 
the supervisor must be the subordinate’s ‘cat’s paw’ for such imputation to be permitted. That is 
not the view of this court . . . .”). 
106. 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007). 
107. Id. at 919. 
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rejected “[t]hese dicta [as] doubtful.”108 The Brewer court, instead, ruled that an 
employer is liable only if a biased subordinate has a “‘singular influence’” over 
the employment decision.109 The court then nudged even closer to the Fourth 
Circuit by stating that “[f]or a nominal non-decision-maker’s influence to put an 
employer in violation of Title VII, the employee must possess so much 
influence as to basically be herself the true ‘functional[] . . . decision-
maker.’”110 Then, in a manner similar to the Tenth Circuit in BCI, the Seventh 
Circuit stressed that even if a plaintiff establishes such a level of influence, “the 
employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker 
independently investigates the claims before acting.”111 
The BCI and Brewer decisions share some important features. Both 
decisions adopt a causation threshold that requires a greater showing than the 
lenient “influence” standard.112 Additionally, both decisions underscore that an 
independent investigation conducted by the ultimate decisionmaker is sufficient 
to break the chain of causation. The devil here is in the details. The Tenth 
Circuit in BCI did not explain what is required of a plaintiff in order to show 
that a subordinate’s bias “caused” the adverse employment decision. Similarly, 
neither decision provided much guidance as to what constitutes an adequate 
employer investigation or under what circumstances such an investigation 
should be expected or required. It is to these and other questions that we now 
turn.  
IV. THREE CRUCIAL ISSUES 
The three standards discussed above rely on very different theoretical and 
policy foundations. Considerations of causation and corrective justice serve as 
the foundation for the lenient standard.113 The core notion here is that 
employees should be afforded redress for employment decisions tainted by 
workplace discrimination.114 The strict standard is primarily grounded in 
agency principles with the guiding objective being that an employer should not 
be held liable for employees’ acts that are neither enabled by delegated 
authority nor otherwise aided by the agency relationship.115 Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 917 (citing Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 
2005)). 
110. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 
1015 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
111. Id. at 920. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 46–54. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 40–57. 
114. See id. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 59–84. 
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intermediate standard also pays homage to questions of causation, but with a 
focus aimed more at preven 116tion than redress.  
                                                                                                                                 
Each of these foundational considerations has considerable merit. Rather 
than endorsing any one of these principles to the detriment of the others, 
however, a better approach is to attempt to achieve a balance among these 
laudable principles. Toward that end, this Part examines these key objectives 
sequentially by asking the following questions: (1) What is the appropriate 
causation standard regarding the impact of the biased subordinate’s conduct?; 
(2) When is the subordinate’s discriminatory bias properly attributable to the 
employer?; and (3) What should be the impact of an employer’s investigation 
into the underlying circumstances?  
A. Causation 
1. Proving Causation 
As indicated above, federal antidiscrimination statutes generally prohibit an 
employer or agent from discriminating “because of” an individual’s protected 
trait. 117 Cases addressing the cat’s paw concept of liability implicate the realm 
of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact forms of discrimination.118 
Thus, the ultimate question in such cases “is whether the plaintiff was the victim 
of intentional discrimination.”119 
A plaintiff can prove a claim of intentional discrimination through one of 
two methods. The first is the three-part “pretext” framework set forth in the 
seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.120 Under that approach, a 
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.121 Second, the 
employer must respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 89–111. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
118. Claims of disparate treatment arise when an employer treats some people less 
favorably because of their protected class status. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 
44, 52 (2003) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). 
Disparate impact claims, in contrast, involve employment practices that are facially neutral in 
form, but which disproportionately disqualify members of a protected group in practice. See id. 
(quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15). 
119. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
120. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
121. Id. Typically, this step consists of proof that the employee (1) is a member of a 
protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was discharged from the position; and (4) 
was replaced by a nonmember of the protected class. See, e.g., id. (establishing the framework); 
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the framework). 
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decision.122 This burden is only one of production and involves no credibility 
assessments.123 If the employer carries this burden, the presumption of 
discrimination disappears, and the employee must then prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for its 
action was a pretext for intentional discrimination.124 The Supreme Court, in 
two clarifying decisions, has held that a showing of pretext does not 
automatically entitle an employee to judgment as a matter of law,125 but the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with a showing that the employer’s 
asserted justification is false, “may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated.”126 
The second proof method is the “mixed-motive” framework. In its 1989 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,127 the Supreme Court held that even if 
an employee demonstrates that an employer considered an impermissible factor 
such as age, race, sex, or disability in making an employment decision, the 
employer may avoid liability by showing it would have made the same decision 
even without consideration of the impermissible factor.128 The burden of 
persuasion shifts to the employer on this latter issue.129 
Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, modified the Price Waterhouse 
analysis by providing that liability under Title VII occurs if discrimination was 
a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, even if the employer also was 
motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.130 Pursuant to the Act, an 
employer’s showing that it would have made the same decision even if it had 
not considered the impermissible factor serves only to limit the employee’s 
remedies to injunctive and declaratory relief and, in appropriate cases, 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.131 
Following the lead of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse,132 most courts utilize the mixed-motive method of analysis in 
                                                                                                                                 
 
122. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
123. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981). 
124. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).  
125. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000) (citing 
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 519); St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 519 (“It is not enough . . . to disbelieve the 
employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.”). 
126. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 
127. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)). 
128. Id. at 244–45. 
129. Id. at 246. 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2000). 
131. Id. § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B). The provision explicitly bars the award of damages and the 
issuance of an order requiring admission, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.  
132. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my view, in order 
to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment 
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cases where plaintiffs present direct evidence of discrimination,133 while 
utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework in cases involving only 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination.134 That dichotomy has been called 
into question following the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa.135 In Desert Palace, the Supreme Court held that direct evidence is not 
needed to meet the plaintiff’s burden.136 Interpreting the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
amendment, the Court said that “a plaintiff need only present sufficient [direct 
or circumstantial] evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for 137any employment practice.’”   
                                                                                                                                 
The Desert Palace decision, on its face, clearly modifies the mixed-motive 
framework.138 Since Desert Palace, however, the circuit courts have disagreed 
as to how Desert Palace affects the McDonnell Douglas framework. Some 
circuits have held that Desert Place did not affect McDonnell Douglas, while 
other circuits have held that, as a result of Desert Palace, the motivating factor 
inquiry merges with the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.139 Under 
the latter approach, a trial court is likely to grant an employer’s motion for 
summary judgment only if the employee fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether a protected characteristic was a motivating 
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the 
decision.”). 
133. Direct evidence , as contrasted with circumstantial evidence, refers to evidence that, if 
believed, would prove the existence of discrimination without inferences or presumption. See, e.g., 
HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 3.2, at 115 (2001) (“Examples [of direct evidence] include epithets or slurs uttered by 
an authorized agent of the employer, a decisionmaker’s admission that he would or did act against 
the plaintiff because of his or her protected characteristic, or, even more clearly, an employer 
policy framed squarely in terms of race, sex, religion, or national origin.”). There is widespread 
disagreement as to what type of evidence is “direct” in nature. Id. at 117. 
134. Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment As a Theory of Discrimination: The Need 
for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 28–29 (2005); see also Johnson v. 
Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to present 
any direct evidence of discrimination, the burden-shifting approach first set forth in [McDonnell 
Douglas] . . . applies to the present case.” (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 
(6th Cir.2000))); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Absent 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as is typically the case, proof via circumstantial evidence 
is assembled using the framework set forth in the seminal case of [McDonnell Douglas]”). 
135. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
136. Id. at 101–02. 
137. Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)). 
138. See id. at 101–02. 
139. See Kristina N. Klein, Comment, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and its Impact on the 
Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2006) (discussing the Eighth 
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals’ approach to leave McDonnell Douglas unaffected, and the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ approach to alter McDonnell Douglas’s third prong). 
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factor in the employment decision.140 Some circuits have not applied the Desert 
Palace holding to cases arising under the ADEA and continue to limit the 
mixed-motive framework in the age discrimination context to cases entailing 
direct evidence.141 
Regardless of the pertinent evidentiary framework, the bottom line in cases 
of subordinate bias is that some causal link must be established between the 
biased views of the subordinate and the adverse employment action. This link 
can be accomplished through either framework. Under the pretext framework, 
the plaintiff can argue that an employer’s asserted legitimate reason was 
actually a pretext for discrimination harbored by a subordinate.142 Under the 
mixed-motive framework, the plaintiff can argue that, although there may have 
been some legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the 
subordinate’s bias played a motivating role in the decision.143 Under either 
framework, the ultimate question posed by Title VII is whether discrimination 
was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s decision,144 and both frameworks 
are designed to provide an answer to that question.145  
2. Causation in the Context of Subordinate Bias Liability  
The three subordinate bias liability standards discussed above utilize a 
variety of causation tests. On one end of the spectrum, the lenient standard 
requires only that the subordinate’s bias have some causal “influence” on the 
resulting employment decision.146 On the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth 
Circuit’s strict standard finds causation satisfied only if the biased subordinate 
is, for practical purposes, the “actual” or “principal” decisionmaker.147 The two 
intermediate decisions describe their respective causation requirements in 
                                                                                                                                 
140. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Such 
comments preclude summary judgment because a rational finder of fact could conclude that age 
played a role in [the supervisor’s] decision to terminate [the plaintiff].”).  
141. See, e.g., Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“If direct evidence is used, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the test laid out in Price 
Waterhouse, in order to prove a violation of the ADEA.”); EEOC v. Warfield–Rohr Casket Co., 
Inc., 364 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[D]irect evidence is still a prerequisite for a mixed-
motive analysis in ADEA cases.”). But see Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311 (applying the reasoning of 
Desert Palace in an ADEA case). 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 120–126. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 127–141. 
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2000).  
145. See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
109, 134–38 (2008) (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas test, similar to the mixed-motive 
framework, proves “motivating factor” causation rather than “but for” causation).  
146. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
147. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
20 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:___ 
different terms. The Tenth Circuit requires that the subordinate bias “cause” the 
resulting harm, but the court does not describe how that step should be 
accomplished.148 The Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, requires a showing of 
“singular influence” akin to that of the “functional[] . . . decision-maker,” 
bringing it nearer to the Fourth Circuit’s approach on this issue.149 
The most appropriate causation test is the one that replicates the language 
of Title VII itself. That is, an employment action may be deemed to be “because 
of” discrimination where subordinate bias operates as “a motivating factor” of 
the employer’s employment action.150 Since this test tracks the core requirement 
of Title VII causation, it is most likely to effectuate the causal touchstone 
envisioned by Congress.151  
The lenient standard’s “any influence” test152 sometimes falls short of this 
benchmark. It is true, of course, that subordinate bias that “influences”153 an 
employment decision will often be “a motivating factor”154 of such a decision. 
But, to the extent that the lenient standard imposes liability in circumstances 
where the influence in question does not rise to the level of a factor that actually 
motivates the employer’s decision, the Tenth Circuit’s criticism in BCI that such 
a “weak relationship . . . improperly eliminates a requirement of causation”155 is 
well taken.  
However, both the Hill and Brewer decisions go too far in the opposite 
direction. To the extent that these decisions require that a biased subordinate 
serve as a “principal,” “actual,” or “functional” decisionmaker,156 they 
essentially impose a “but for” causation requirement. But for causation 
contemplates a causal connection that is definitive or necessary in nature, such 
that the event in question would not have occurred but for that specific factor.157 
As the Supreme Court noted in Price Waterhouse, Title VII’s “because of” 
language, even prior to the 1991 amendment, did not require a showing of but 
                                                                                                                                 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 99–104. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 109–111. 
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), (m) (2000).  
151. See, e.g., Sadki v. SUNY Coll. at Brockport, 310 F. Supp. 2d 506, 519 (W.D.N.Y. 
2004) (finding that evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a biased 
subordinate’s actions so influenced a formal decisionmaker’s conclusion “that her discriminatory 
animus became a motivating factor in the ultimate decision” (emphasis added)).  
152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 46–54. 
 
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000). 
155. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486–87 (10th 
Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
157. Katz, supra note 145, at 121. 
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for causation.158 And, such a requirement certainly compels a greater degree of 
proof than does the “motivating factor” language added by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.159 As Professor Martin Katz notes, the motivating factor standard is 
“minimally causal,” as compared to a but for standard, requiring only that a 
factor have a tendency to bring about a certain outcome.160 By imposing a more 
onerous causation standard for subordinate bias cases than that embodied in 
Title VII, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits effectively immunize employment 
decisions that Congress meant to prohibit.  
The Hill court attempted to justify this higher standard by maintaining that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves mandated the “actual decisionmaker” 
standard.161 While it is true that the Court in Reeves described the formal 
decisionmaker’s husband as the “actual decisionmaker,”162 the use of that 
phrase was more likely descriptive of the evidence presented in that case than a 
pronouncement of legal principle. As the Tenth Circuit noted in BCI, the 
majority in Hill misinterpreted Reeves, taking the term “actual decisionmaker” 
as setting the outer boundaries of liability, when in fact this language was used 
only to describe the subordinate’s role in the particular fact pattern presented.163  
Policy considerations provide further support for preferring a motivating 
factor standard over an actual decisionmaker standard. Federal 
antidiscrimination statutes serve two primary purposes: to compensate the 
victims of discrimination and to deter the occurrence of discrimination in the 
workplace.164 As remedial legislation, these statutes should be interpreted 
broadly in order to effectuate these purposes.165 
The Supreme Court has explained that the purpose behind the compensation 
goal of antidiscrimination statutes is “to restore the employee to the position he 
                                                                                                                                 
158. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2m 
(2000)). 
159. Katz, supra note 145, at 121–22. 
160. Katz, supra note 145, at 121. 
161. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2004). 
162. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152 (2000). 
163. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
164. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2m (2000)) (stating Congress’s “Findings” and “Purposes” for amending the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357–58 
(1995) (stating that both Title VII and the ADEA seek to remove discrimination from the work 
place and compensate victims of workplace injustice); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 417–18 (1975) (stating that the primary objectives of Title VII are to equalize employment 
opportunities and “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination”).  
165. See EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d 899, 899 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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or she would have been in absent the discrimination.”166 When a subordinate’s 
bias acts as a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision, the 
victimized employee suffers harm resulting from discrimination. Yet, if the 
subordinate’s bias falls short of constituting the act of an ultimate 
decisionmaker, the Fourth Circuit’s standard would not redress the employee’s 
loss. As Judge Michael noted in his dissenting opinion in Hill, the Fourth 
Circuit’s strict causation standard “removes an entire class of discrimination 
cases from the protection” of antidiscrimination statutes with the result that 
“unlawful discrimination will go unaddressed in many cases.”167 
The strict standard also fails to further the deterrent purpose of federal 
antidiscrimination statutes. In the context of cases involving subordinate bias, 
discriminatory employment actions often take place even though the formal 
decisionmaker is unaware of the subordinate’s underlying motives. Without any 
meaningful threat of liability, employers will have little incentive to create 
processes to prevent and uncover these situations. A more accessible motivating 
factor test likely will “have the salutary effect of encouraging employers to 
verify information and review recommendations before taking adverse 
employment actions against members of protected groups.”168  
Similarly, but in the opposite direction, a less accessible causation test—
such as the Fourth Circuit’s strict standard—may provide employers with an 
incentive to design decision making processes that intentionally mask the 
underlying discriminatory motive as a basis to avoid liability. An employer, for 
example, may set up “many layers of pro forma review” as a means to insulate 
itself from potential subordinate bias.169 It would not serve the deterrent 
purpose of antidiscrimination statutes to encourage such “willful blindness” of 
subordinate motives as a defensive human resources strategy.170 
                                                                                                                                 
 
166. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 
764 (1976)). 
167. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 304 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Michael, J., dissenting). 
168. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007). In addition, the Tenth Circuit stated, “The Fourth 
Circuit’s standard also undermines the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims, allowing 
employers to escape liability even when a subordinate’s discrimination is the sole cause of an 
adverse employment action, on the theory that the subordinate did not exercise complete control 
over the decisionmaker.” Id. at 487.  
169. Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1147 (7th Cir.1993)); see also Russell v. McKinney 
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 n.13 (5th Cir. 2000) (“If . . . we adhered to a rigid formalistic 
application, employers could easily insulate themselves from liability by ensuring that the one who 
performed the employment action was isolated from the employee, thus eviscerating the spirit of 
the ‘actual decisionmaker’ guideline.”).  
170. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 486 (“Recognition of subordinate bias claims forecloses a 
strategic option for employers who might seek to evade liability, even in the face of rampant race 
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In sum, the motivating factor test represents the causation standard that is 
most consistent with the language and purposes of federal antidiscrimination 
statutes. This standard will absolve employers from liability for decisions that 
are not actually motivated by discrimination, while affording redress for those 
decisions in which unlawful discrimination plays a motivating role.  
B. Agency Principles  
1. Employer Responsibility for the Acts of Its Agents 
A second key issue concerns when an employer should bear legal 
responsibility for the biased acts of subordinate employees. As noted above, the 
prohibition contained in federal antidiscrimination statutes extends only to 
actions undertaken by an “employer” and “any agents” of an employer.171 Thus, 
even if a biased subordinate’s actions can be linked in a causal sense with an 
adverse employment action, the question remains as to whether the subordinate 
is acting as an agent of the employer such that the subordinate’s conduct is 
legally attributable to the employer for liability purposes.172  
In general, an employer may be liable under federal antidiscrimination 
statutes in one of two ways. First, an employer may be directly liable for its own 
actions, such as where a corporate board of directors adopts a policy that 
adversely affects members of a protected group.173 Second, and alternatively, an 
employer may be vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its agents.174  
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,175 the Supreme Court discussed 
these two bases for employer liability in the context of sexual harassment. The 
Court initially recognized that “[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for 
                                                                                                                                 
discrimination among subordinates, through willful blindness as to the source of reports and 
recommendations.” (citing Russell, 235 F.3d at 227 n.13)). 
171. See supra text accompanying note 5.  
172. See, e.g., Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1713(citing Hill, 354 F.3d at 287) (“[W]hether a 
subordinate employee who influences the employer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff can 
properly be defined as an ‘employer’ or an ‘agent,’ rests in an analysis of agency principles.”). 
173. See, e.g., Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“[D]iscrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a corporation’s board of 
directors. . . . Nonetheless, Title VII remedies . . . generally run against the employer as an 
entity.”).  
174. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court today manufactures a rule that employers are vicariously liable if 
supervisors create a sexually hostile work environment . . . .”); Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc., 909 
F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[D]iscriminatory policies violative of Title VII, acts that may 
constitute Title VII violations are generally effected through the actions of individuals, and often 
an individual may take such a step even in defiance of company policy.”). 
175. 524 U.S. at 742. 
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employer liability under Title VII.”176 Under the negligence standard, a court 
may hold an employer liable where the employer’s own negligence is the cause 
of the harassment.177 For example, an employer will be liable for the 
harassment caused by a coworker or a supervisor acting outside the scope of 
employment if the employer “knew or should have known about the conduct 
and fail 178ed to stop it.”   
                                                                                                                                 
The Court then explained that although negligence may be a source of 
direct liability, the plaintiff in Ellerth had raised a different issue: whether an 
employer could be strictly liable for harassment undertaken by a supervisor.179 
The Court responded in the affirmative, ruling that employers are vicariously 
and strictly liable where a supervisor with immediate authority over the 
employee creates an actionable hostile environment resulting in a “tangible 
employment action.”180 A “tangible employment action,” according to the 
Court, is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or 
a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”181 The Court rationalized 
imposing strict liability upon the employer by explaining that a supervisor 
cannot make a tangible employment decision absent an agency relationship; 
therefore, “[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the 
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on 
subordinates.”182  
The Court, however, limited its holding by stating that an employer should 
not be subject to strict liability when a supervisor’s harassment does not take the 
form of a “tangible employment action.”183 In this context, the employer may 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or to damages.184 Under the affirmative 
defense, the employer must prove both “that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and “that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative 
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”185 As subsequent decisions illustrate, this defense is most often 
176. Id. at 759. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 765.  
181. Id. at 761. 
182. Id. at 761–62. The Court had initially noted, “Tangible employment actions fall within 
the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a 
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her 
control.” Id. at 762. 
183. Id. at 765. 
184. Id. 
185. Id.  
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established where an employer establishes an antiharassment policy and an 
employee claiming harassment fails to use that policy to report the alleged 
harassment.186  
Although the exact scope of vicarious liability under antidiscrimination 
statutes is uncertain, some basic principles are clear. First, Congress, by 
defining a covered employer for purposes of antidiscrimination statutes to 
include “any agent” of the employer, “evince[d] an intent to place some limits 
on the acts of employees for which employers . . . are to be held responsible.”187 
In other words, an employer is not liable for each and every discriminatory act 
committed by one of its employees. Second, because discrimination is in the 
nature of a statutory tort, an employer is liable for the intentional acts 
committed by its employees within the scope of employment when the 
employee is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.188 
However, an employer is also vicariously liable for employee acts taken outside 
the scope of employment—such as acts of sexual harassment that are not 
undertaken in order to serve the employer’s interests189—only if the employee 
“was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”190  
2. Agency Principles in the Context of Subordinate Bias Liability  
The circuit courts, here again, have taken a wide variety of approaches with 
respect to the issue of agency liability. Those circuits following the lenient 
standard tend not to discuss agency principles at all.191 These courts generally 
                                                                                                                                 
 
186. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort & Sarah J. Gorajski, When Quitting is Fitting: The Need 
for a Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 632 (2006) (“A statistical analysis of 
published federal court decisions issued after Ellerth and Faragher concludes that ‘employees can 
almost guarantee a [summary judgment] victory for the employer if they fail to report.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting David Sherwyn, Michael Heise, & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees 
and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the 
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 
1286 (2001))).  
187. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
188. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c) (1958)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984). 
189. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798–801 (finding such acts of sexual harassment not to 
be taken in the course of employment). 
190. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) 
(1958)); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (“[Restatement § 219] covers not only cases involving 
the abuse of apparent authority, but also cases in which tortious conduct is made possible or 
facilitated by the existence of the actual agency relationship.”). 
191. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“[W]hile the courts often utilize the same terminology as that employed by the Shager 
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find that employer liability automatically follows once causation is established. 
Given the lack of overt discussion, it is not clear whether these courts view the 
agency link as established by virtue of the actions of the biased subordinate or 
by virtue of the actions of the ultimate decisionmaker. The Seventh Circuit in 
Shager, one of the few decisions to address agency concerns, seems to have 
adopted the former view. The Shager court stated, 
But a supervisory employee who [by influencing a formal 
decisionmaker] fires a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is 
authorized to do, and the wrongful intent with which he does it does not 
carry his behavior so far beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as to 
excuse the employer.192 
In essence, the court in Shager found that, unlike errant acts of coworker 
harassment, the biased acts of a subordinate taken pursuant to delegated 
authority are within the scope of employment and are attributable to the 
employer by means of respondeat superior.193  
The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, relied on agency principles to limit 
employer liability to situations where a biased subordinate has “supervisory or 
disciplinary authority” and is “the one principally responsible for the [adverse] 
decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer.”194 By this ruling, the 
Hill majority construed the Supreme Court’s Ellerth decision as establishing the 
outer contours of agency liability, such that an employer may be vicariously 
liable only for the acts of supervisors that result in a tangible employment 
action.195 The Hill court’s unstated premise is that acts of subordinate bias 
necessarily fall outside the scope of employment and only may be attributed to 
                                                                                                                                 
court, they have not always described the theory in consistent ways, and rarely have they done so 
after a discussion of the agency principles from which the theory emerged and that limit its 
application.”). 
192. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)). 
193. Id. at 404–405. The Shager court went on to state, 
Concern with the futility of derivative liability is absent where the challenged action is 
not harassment, whether on sexual or other grounds by a fellow employee, but discharge 
by a supervisory employee. The deliberate act of an employee acting within the scope of 
his authority is the act of the employer, for an employer, at least where it is a 
corporation, acts only through agents. 
Id. at 404 (citing Hunter v. Allis–Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 
1986); North v. Madison Area Ass’n for Retarded Citizens–Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 
401, 407 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
194. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291.  
195. Id. at 287 (stating that Ellerth “defined the limits of such agency as encompassing 
employer liability for the acts of its employees holding supervisory or other actual power to make 
tangible employment decisions” (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762)). 
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an employer who has empowered the subordinate through the delegation of 
supervisory authority.  
The Tenth Circuit in BCI once again charted a middle course with respect 
to the agency issue. Chiding the Fourth Circuit for its more restrictive approach, 
the BCI court found that “agency law principles include[] not only 
‘decisionmakers’ but other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation, 
cause injury.”196 The Tenth Circuit noted, as examples, those employees with 
delegated “authority to monitor performance, report disciplinary infractions, and 
recommend employment actions.”197 The Tenth Circuit, accordingly, appears to 
have assumed that acts of subordinate bias may fall outside the scope of 
employment, but that an employee’s misuse of some form of delegated 
authority—although not necessarily supervisory authority—is necessary for 
such actions to be imputed to the employer. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the 
agency issue is the best approach. Its focus on the misuse of delegated authority 
is superior to the extremes of the other two standards.  
A fundamental problem with the lenient standard is that it essentially 
jettisons the agency issue altogether. This is inappropriate, as the Supreme 
Court has expressly cautioned that the inclusion of the term “agents” in the 
statutory definition of a covered employer in antidiscrimination statutes was 
intended to serve as a limitation on the reach of employer liability for employee 
conduct.198 To the extent that the lenient standard makes employers liable for 
the biased acts of any and all employees, the standard improperly ignores this 
limitation.  
As a matter of policy, one of the principal purposes of the agency limitation 
is to make employers legally responsible only for the discriminatory acts of 
employees that it reasonably may have prevented.199 Thus, employers are not 
liable for the harassing acts of its rank-and-file employees unless the employer 
knew or should have known about such conduct and failed to take steps to curb 
it.200 The same concern exists in the context of subordinate bias. Consider, for 
example, the situation of an employee with no delegated authority who, acting 
                                                                                                                                 
196. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007) (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760). The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908 (7th 
Cir. 2007), the other decision adopting an intermediate standard for subordinate bias liability, did 
not address the agency issue. 
197. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485. 
198. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); see also Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–92 (1998) (noting that the traditional parameters of agency law 
delimit the reach of employer liability). 
199. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he ultimate concern is 
with confining the employer’s or principal’s liability to the general class of cases in which he has 
the practical ability to head off the injury to his employee’s, or other agent’s, victim.”). 
200. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  
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on discriminatory bias, surreptitiously intercepts and alters a supervisor’s 
performance evaluation of a fellow employee. Unless the employer has reason 
to suspect the alteration, it should not automatically be liable for consequences 
it did not set in motion.  
The Seventh Circuit’s discussion in Shager of employer liability for biased 
actions taken by a subordinate in the course of employment is not to the 
contrary.201 In Shager, the subordinate employee in question was a lower level 
supervisor to whom the employer had delegated the authority to make 
disciplinary recommendations.202 When the Shager court described the 
supervisor’s biased actions as taken in the course of employment, it likely was 
referring to the fact that the employer’s grant of such delegated authority aided 
the supervisor’s actions.203 That does not mean, however, that the biased 
manipulations of employees with no delegated authority should automatically 
be attributed to the employer on a respondeat superior basis.  
While the lenient standard sets too low of a bar for agency liability, the 
strict standard errs in the opposite direction. Here again, the Fourth Circuit in 
Hill inappropriately construed a Supreme Court decision as establishing the 
outer boundaries of potential liability. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that an 
employer is strictly liable for a supervisor’s workplace harassment that takes the 
form of a tangible employment action.204 The Fourth Circuit seized upon this 
ruling to conclude that an employer only may be held liable for subordinate bias 
when the subordinate is a supervisor who serves as the principal or the ultimate 
decisionmaker concerning a tangible employment action.205 But, the Ellerth 
Court did not limit the reach of potential employer liability solely to that set of 
circumstances.206 The Ellerth Court, instead, found that “[w]hatever the exact 
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will 
always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a 
subordinate.”207 Beyond that zone of automatic liability, the Supreme Court 
noted that other circumstances also might implicate the agency relation, but that 
the outcome in such cases “is less obvious.”208  
                                                                                                                                 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 192–193.  
202. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399–400. 
203. Id. at 405 (“But a supervisory employee who fires a subordinate is doing the kind of 
thing that he is authorized to do . . . .”). 
204. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63. 
205. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004). 
206. See Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1736 (“The Court in Ellerth, however, never limited 
vicarious liability to acts of one who was principally responsible for the adverse employment 
action . . . .”).  
207. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63. 
208. Id. at 763. 
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Of particular significance is the fact that the Ellerth Court made its ruling in 
the context of determining the grounds for strictly imposing liability on an 
employer.209 However, subordinate bias liability poses a different issue.210 The 
issue here, instead, is whether an employer potentially may be liable for an 
adverse act set in motion by a biased subordinate. Just as an employer may be 
held liable for an agent’s harassing conduct beyond those circumstances 
warranting strict liability—such as where an employer is unable to establish the 
two-part affirmative defense—so too should an employer face possible liability 
for the misuse of delegated authority by a subordinate in circumstances beyond 
the narrow confines of the Ellerth strict liability test.  
The Ellerth decision ultimately stands for the proposition that an employer 
may be liable for agency purposes when an employee misuses delegated 
authority that results in an adverse employment action.211 In policy terms, the 
crucial point is that an employer may appropriately face potential liability when 
it has empowered an employee with authority that carries with it the potential to 
inflict injury.212 The misuse of delegated authority by a supervisor who acts as a 
principal decisionmaker certainly falls within the parameters of this prohibition; 
it does not, however, exhaust the universe of such possibilities. The misuse of 
other types of delegated authority also may enable employees—including on 
occasion nonsupervisors—to inflict economic injury on their fellow 
employees.213 Consider, for example, the case of an employer who empowers 
an employee with no formal supervisory authority over another employee to 
                                                                                                                                 
209. See id. at 764–65. 
210. See Hill, 354 F.3d at 302 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Ellerth simply tells us that when a 
supervisor or other decisionmaker fires an employee for whatever reason, we automatically have 
an agent whose personnel action is imputed to the employer. That does not answer today’s 
question: when a biased subordinate who lacks decisionmaking authority substantially influences 
an employment decision, may his bias be imputed to the formal decisionmaker who acts for the 
employer. I would hold that it can be.”). 
211. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–65. 
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) cmt. e (1958) (explaining that the 
aided by the “agency relation” standard of section 219(2) applies to situations where “the servant 
may be able to cause harm because of his position as agent”); see also EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola 
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 
(2007) (“The ‘aided by the agency relation’ standard applies even more clearly to subordinate bias 
claims, such as ‘cat’s paw’ or ‘rubber stamp’ claims, because the allegedly biased subordinate 
accomplishes his discriminatory goals by misusing the authority granted to him by the 
employer . . . .”). 
213. See, e.g., BCI, 450 F.3d at 487 (“[T]he issue is whether the biased subordinate’s 
discriminatory reports, recommendations, or other actions caused the adverse employment action.” 
(citing Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004))); Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1729–
30 (“While in some of these cases the biased employees may have had certain supervisory 
authority, the courts never considered that authority as a precondition to imputing liability to the 
employers.”). 
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make a recommendation on matters such as promotion or discipline. Even if the 
recommender does not serve as a principal decisionmaker on that issue, 
employer liability may be appropriate if the recommender’s misuse of that 
lesser form of delegated authority serves as a motivating factor in an adverse 
employment action.214 Indeed, the EEOC has expressly endorsed that position 
in an enforcement guidance.215  
                                                                                                                                 
In the end, this Article argues that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in BCI 
provides the proper balance for gauging agency liability. Such liability should 
not extend overbroadly to the actions of all employees or be limited too 
narrowly to only those supervisors who act as ultimate decisionmakers. The 
test, instead, should focus on whether a biased subordinate misuses authority 
delegated by an employer as a means of causing an adverse employment action.  
C. Employer Investigation  
While the two circuits championing an intermediate path with respect to 
subordinate bias liability expressly describe the impact of an employer’s 
investigation as part of their proposed analytical framework,216 there is broad 
agreement among all viewpoints that such an investigation can play a major role 
in assessing the propriety of imposing employer liability. The core notion here 
is that an employer’s investigation into the circumstances underlying the 
allegations made by a biased subordinate can serve to break the chain of 
causation by removing the taint of discrimination introduced by the 
subordinate’s actions.217  
214. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226–29 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that allegedly biased influence of a subordinate employee may be imputed to employer 
with respect to an adverse action suffered by someone in a coordinate position). 
215. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful 
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Comp. Man. (BNA) No. 915.002, at 17 (June 18, 1999), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (stating that an individual may be a 
“supervisor” if his job includes recommending “tangible job decisions affecting an employee” and 
those recommendations are given “substantial weight by the final decisionmaker[s]”).  
216. See supra text accompanying notes 90–111. 
217. See, e.g., English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[The 
employer’s] attempt to balance the investigators’ findings with [the plaintiff’s] own version of 
events cuts off any alleged bias on the part of the investigators from the chain of events leading to 
English’s termination. Therefore, the cat’s paw doctrine does not apply in this case.”); Long v. 
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (“If [the employer] based his decisions on his own 
independent investigation, the causal link between [the biased subordinates’] allegedly retaliatory 
intent and [the plaintiffs’] terminations would be broken.”); Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 
942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[The employer] had conducted an independent investigation of [the 
plaintiff’s] conduct. . . . The causal nexus necessary to support [the plaintiff’s] prima facie case is 
absent.”).  
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Both the Tenth and the Seventh Circuits give the role of an employer’s 
investigation—or lack thereof—center stage in determining the reach of 
subordinate bias liability. The Tenth Circuit in BCI stated that an employer can 
avoid liability “by conducting an independent investigation of the allegations 
against an employee.”218 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit stressed that even if a 
plaintiff makes out a singular level of influence by a biased subordinate, “the 
employer does not face Title VII liability so long as the decisionmaker 
independently investigates the claims before acting.”219  
Courts following both the lenient and the strict standards have also 
recognized that an independent investigation of a subordinate’s allegations may 
serve to insulate an employer from liability. At least four circuits following the 
lenient standard have expressly recognized the possibility of an investigation 
defense.220 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Hill, in explaining that the biased 
subordinate was not the actual decisionmaker, stated, “[I]t is undisputed that 
Dixon personally investigated and verified the accuracy of the discrepancy 
reports, and made an independent, non-biased decision . . . that the infractions 
were sufficiently serious to warrant . . . termination.”221 
Given the nearly universal recognition of the importance of an employer’s 
investigation into subordinate bias liability, the crucial questions concerning this 
topic devolve into two subsidiary issues. First, what type of an investigation is 
sufficient to dissipate the taint of subordinate bias? Second, when should an 
employer be expected or required to undertake such an investigation?  
1. Type of Investigation 
As the Fourth Circuit’s articulation suggests, the general requirement for a 
causation-breaking investigation is that it be a fair and independent examination 
                                                                                                                                 
218. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (citing English, 248 F.3d at 1011). 
219. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007). 
220. See, e.g., Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Thus, if an adverse 
employment action is the consequence of an entirely independent investigation by an employer, the 
animus of the retaliating employee is not imputed to the employer.”); Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, 
Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When the employer makes an effort to determine 
the employee’s side of the story before making a tangible employment decision affecting that 
employee, however, it should not be held liable under Title VII for that decision based only on its 
employee’s hidden discriminatory motives.”); Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807(6th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered 
decision before taking an adverse employment action.”); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 
(5th Cir. 1996) (“If [the employer] based his decisions on his own independent investigation, the 
causal link between [the biased subordinates’] allegedly retaliatory intent and [the plaintiffs’] 
terminations would be broken.”).  
221. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 296 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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of circumstances underlying the contemplated employment action.222 As a 
conceptual matter, an investigation is fair and independent if it serves to replace 
the influence of a subordinate’s bias with the untainted determination of an 
unbiased ultimate decisionmaker.223 That goal, of course, is easier to state than 
are the particulars of what constitutes a fair and independent investigation on a 
ground level.  
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the mere fact that an 
unbiased decisionmaker undertakes an investigation may not necessarily have 
the effect of dispelling the taint of subordinate bias. Social psychology research 
suggests that once a lower level supervisor offers a recommendation, “it can 
reasonably be expected to influence the ultimate decision maker’s judgment in a 
recommendation-consistent direction, even if he conducts his own 
investigation.”224 This phenomenon, known as expectancy confirmation bias, 
derives from the likelihood that the decisionmaker will give deference to the 
supervisor’s view of the situation due to the supervisor’s more highly influential 
position in the corporate power structure.225 As a result, the independent 
investigation itself may be tainted with bias because “once the decisionmaker 
receives any complaints, reports, or recommendations from the supervisor, her 
judgment may be anchored to the information therein, and she may then search 
for information and process it in a manner tending to recreate the supervisor’s 
bias.”226 Thus, some commentators suggest that an investigation can succeed at 
purging the taint of subordinate bias only by “explicitly considering the 
possibility that bias had influenced the process at its earlier stages.”227 A bias-
                                                                                                                                 
222. See id.; Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1732–34. 
223. See, e.g., Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547–48 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“[I]t is clear that, when the causal relationship between the subordinate’s illicit motive and 
the employer’s ultimate decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an 
independent and legally permissive basis, the basis of the subordinate is not relevant.” (citing Long 
v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996))); Recent Cases: Tenth Circuit Clarifies 
Causation Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1702–06 (2007) 
[hereinafter Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard] (“The BCI court should have . . . held that 
independent investigations immunize employers from subordinate bias liability only when the 
decisionmaker consciously seeks out evidence of the supervisor’s bias and actively correctives for 
its effects on the investigation and the decision.”). 
224. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524. 
225. See, e.g., id. at 525 (“[R]esearch has demonstrated quite convincingly that when 
presented with a claim (i.e., Mary is a poor performer and should be fired), people tend to treat the 
claim as a tentative hypothesis and proceed to test that hypothesis by searching for evidence that 
will confirm it.”); see also Monica J. Harris, et al., Awareness of Power as a Moderator of 
Expectancy Confirmation: Who’s the Boss Around Here?, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
220 (1998) (“People tend to defer to those who are in positions of higher power, and that deference 
may include confirming the expectations of the others.”).  
226. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223, at 1703. 
227. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527. 
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conscious investigation often will be necessary to eradicate the causal effect of 
subordinate bias.  
The existing case law provides some guidance as to the type of 
investigations that courts have found to be adequate or, in contrast, inadequate. 
The Eleventh Circuit in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa228 found that an 
employer’s three-day evidentiary hearing, complete with legal counsel and 
witnesses before a three-member panel of neutral decisionmakers, clearly 
passed muster.229 Most courts that have considered the issue also have found 
that a face-to-face meeting, or an offer of such a meeting, between the formal 
decisionmaker and the employee alleging discrimination is sufficient to break 
the chain of causation.230 In this regard, the Tenth Circuit in BCI stated in 
dictum that “under our precedent, simply asking an employee for his version of 
events may defeat the inference that an employment decision was racially 
discriminatory.”231 Finally, some courts’ decisions have suggested that an 
independent examination of the underlying circumstances may be sufficient 
even without a personal interview of the individual about to be disciplined.232  
While less attention has been devoted to describing instances in which 
investigations are not adequate to dispel subordinate bias liability, courts have 
identified at least two such circumstances. First, a formal decisionmaker cannot 
justify the investigation defense simply by meeting with the biased subordinate 
to discuss the subordinate’s recommendation.233 That step is likely to 
                                                                                                                                 
 
228. 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999). 
229. See id. at 1330–31. 
230. See, e.g., English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A 
plaintiff cannot claim that a firing authority relied uncritically upon a subordinate’s prejudiced 
recommendation where the plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to and rebut the evidence 
supporting the recommendation.”); Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249–
50 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employer’s meeting with the employee broke the chain of 
causation between the supervisor’s harassment and the employer’s decision to terminate 
employee); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547–48 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that the chain of causation was broken by the employer’s “proactive involvement” in 
investigating the claims and by employer affording the employee numerous opportunities to 
explain the alleged misconduct). 
231. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 
1220, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
232. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that a 
decisionmaker’s examination of underlying evidence of wrongdoing was sufficient even without a 
follow up interview with the target employee); see also Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 877 
(6th Cir. 2003) (Rosen, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an ultimate decisionmaker’s investigation 
should be deemed adequate when her assessment of employee job performance is “informed 
principally by her own direct, repeated, and unchallenged observations”).  
233. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A 
biased subordinate] was involved directly in the disciplinary process. He serves as plaintiffs’ Skelly 
hearings officer . . . .”). It is likely that the purported investigation in the Fourth Circuit’s Hill 
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exacerbate rather than alleviate the taint of subordinate bias. Second, the Tenth 
Circuit in BCI stated that the mere review of a personnel file by a decisionmaker 
did not constitute an adequate investigation where the file did not provide 
background information concerning the allegations asserted by the biased 
sub
interview took place might not serve to 
rem
                                                                                                                                 
ordinate.234  
In general, an employer who receives a subordinate’s recommendation for 
an adverse employment action would be well advised to engage in a personal 
interview of the subject of the recommendation. In some instances, however, a 
personal interview, by itself, may not necessarily establish such a defense.235 
For example, a decisionmaker might conduct only a perfunctory interview or 
fail to follow through by examining key exculpatory evidence identified by the 
employee during the interview. Similarly, a decisionmaker might conduct the 
interview under circumstances that are overly intimidating or otherwise not 
conducive to a fair and meaningful exchange of information. In circumstances 
such as these, the mere fact that an 
ove the taint of subordinate bias.  
A fair and independent investigation need not be an onerous undertaking. 
An employer should not be expected to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing of 
the type utilized in Stimpson236 or to follow up on each and every explanation 
offered by an employee during an interview.237 Indeed, it should not even be a 
prerequisite for the decisionmaker to reach a “correct” conclusion.238 The 
touchstone, instead, should be whether the decisionmaker has taken sufficient 
decision also would be found inadequate by most courts since the ultimate decisionmaker in that 
case relied on a requested report from the biased subordinate rather than a face-to-face interview 
with the employee under scrutiny. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 
277, 296 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Razzaghi, supra note 16, at 1734 (“[B]y simply relying on 
Fultz’s report as the basis for the decision to terminate Hill, his inquiry falls short of an 
independent investigation.”).  
234. BCI, 450 F.3d at 492–93. 
235. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223, at 1706 (“[M]erely asking the 
employee for her side of the story . . . will not always root out the possible discriminatory motives 
of the supervisor that may have influenced the independent investigation.”); see also Susan Sturm, 
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458, 538 (“[U]ncritical acceptance of internal dispute resolution processes . . . will often leave 
underlying patterns and conditions unchanged.”). 
236. See supra text accompanying note 228. 
237. If such a requirement were imposed, some employees subject to contemplated 
discipline would have an incentive to provide multiple explanations and evidentiary leads as a 
means of deterring the successful conclusion of the investigative process.  
238. See, e.g., Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 411 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he pertinent question is not whether [the decisionmaker] was right to believe that 
[the plaintiff] struck [his coworker] and that as a result [the plaintiff] should be discharged, but 
whether [the decisionmaker’s] belief that this was so was genuine or whether his rationale is 
merely a pretext for age discrimination.”). 
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steps under the circumstances of the case to eliminate subordinate bias as a 
motivating factor in the employer’s ultimate determination; this should include 
a bias-conscious examination of the circumstances in question.239  
2. When an Investigation Should be Required or Expected 
ted to engage in an 
inve
aker of the 
need for a broader investigation.246 The Seventh Circuit explained, 
                                                                                                                                 
With respect to the second investigation subissue, courts generally 
recognize that an employer has discretion in deciding whether to undertake an 
independent investigation into the circumstances of an adverse action 
recommended by a subordinate. In essence, employers have the option to 
engage in an investigation as a means of negating the possibility that a plaintiff 
will be able to establish causation with respect to the impact of subordinate 
bias.240 In that sense, an employer is not required or expec
stigation, but acts at its peril if it chooses not to do so.  
The Seventh Circuit in Brewer adopted a somewhat different approach. In 
that case, a state university discharged Brewer for, among other things, 
dishonestly altering a parking permit.241 One of Brewer’s supervisors, 
Thompson, relayed information concerning the incident to Hendricks, the 
ultimate decisionmaker.242 In addition to receiving Thompson’s information, 
Hendricks examined the altered permit and confirmed that it had been 
altered.243 She did not, however, take any steps to ascertain whether Thompson 
had withheld any additional relevant information because no one, including 
Brewer, had reported such an allegation.244 Hendricks eventually terminated 
Brewer, who filed suit claiming that Thompson had withheld certain relevant 
information due to racial animus.245 The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of 
Brewer’s suit, finding that Brewer had failed to alert the decisionm
239. See supra text accompanying notes 224–227 (discussing the problem of expectancy 
confirmation bias). 
240. See, e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The 
line of cases addressing this particular situation is univocal, and indicates that even where a biased 
employee may have leveled false charges of misconduct against the plaintiff, the employer does 
not face Title VII liability so long as the decision maker independently investigates the claims 
before acting”); English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(suggesting that an employer can avoid liability by conducting an independent investigation of the 
allegations against an employee). 
241. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 913–14. 
242. Id. at 919. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 909.  
246. Id. at 919. 
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Brewer never claimed that Thompson was holding anything back. No 
one has suggested that Brewer was unable to bring such a claim to 
Hendrick’s attention, and until he did so Hendricks had no reason to 
suspect that there were additional relevant facts that she had not 
investigated. . . . Hendricks therefore conducted an independent 
investigation that absolved the University of liability for any deception 
on Thompson’s part.247  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit placed responsibility on the plaintiff to alert 
the decisionmaker as to the need for and scope of the investigation.  
The Seventh Circuit’s position deserves some sympathy because without 
some triggering catalyst an employer can protect itself only by engaging in an 
independent investigation into each and every instance where an adverse 
employment action is premised on some input from a subordinate employee.248 
On the other hand, the Brewer court’s approach places too great of an onus on 
an employee, unless accompanied by some mechanism that facilitates an 
employee complaint process.  
Regarding a related policy issue, both of the principal cases espousing an 
intermediate standard cite policy grounds that militate in favor of encouraging 
employers to engage in independent investigations. As the Seventh Circuit 
stated in Brewer, “Title VII’s primary objective is ‘not to provide redress but 
[to] avoid harm’ by giving employers an incentive to control their 
employees.”249 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in BCI noted that a policy of 
encouraging investigations has “the salutary effect of encouraging employers to 
verify information and review recommendations before taking adverse 
employment actions.”250  
An affirmative stance that encourages independent investigations serves the 
deterrent purpose of antidiscrimination statutes. Allowing a sufficiently fair and 
independent investigation to serve as a defense to liability gives employers the 
motivation and the processes with which to prevent discrimination in the 
                                                                                                                                 
247. Id. (citations omitted). 
248. See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(“We hesitate to require an employer to investigate . . . every action of its employees that could be 
motivated by a discriminatory animus.”). 
249. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 920 (quoting Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605–
06 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (“[Title 
VII’s] ‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to 
provide redress but to avoid harm.” (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 
(1975))). 
250. EEOC v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 
2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931. 
2008] SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY 37 
workplace ab initio.251 Preventing adverse actions from occurring in the first 
place is a better alternative than providing a route to possible future 
compensation in the event such an action comes to pass. Both the employer and 
the employee suffer costs, delays, and other harms that result from litigation, no 
matter the outcome of a particular case. Therefore, if the courts can provide a 
means to encourage employers to prevent these harms from occurring in the 
first place, it seems justifiable and appropriate to do so. 
These same policy considerations apply to workplace harassment. In both 
contexts, an employer faces the potential for liability because of employee 
misdeeds of which the employer may or may not have been aware. The 
Supreme Court responded in the sexual harassment context by establishing a 
liability framework that affirmatively prefers internal deterrence and dispute 
resolution over federal court litigation.252 Thus, as noted above, the Court in 
Ellerth and Faragher established a two-part affirmative defense available to 
employers in cases where a supervisor engages in harassment that does not 
constitute a tangible employment action.253 Pursuant to this defense, an 
employer can avoid liability if it can prove two elements:  
(a) That the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer 
or to avoid harm otherwise.254  
A similar affirmative defense should be recognized in the context of 
subordinate bias liability. In particular, this Article recommends the adoption of 
the following two-prong defense: an employer should not be liable for acts of 
subordinate bias where (1) it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and to 
correct such bias, such as by the implementation of a meaningful anti-bias 
policy, and (2) the plaintiff has unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
preventative or the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or 
                                                                                                                                 
251. Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standard, supra note 223 at 1706 (“Subjecting employers to 
potential liability if they do not conduct a bias-seeking investigation before discharging a member 
of a protected class will encourage employers to reevaluate their procedures and voluntarily 
implement solutions to effect positive changes in the workplace.”). 
252. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 131, § 2.22, at 73 (stating that the Ellerth and Faragher 
framework provides employers with an incentive to adopt internal grievance procedures and that 
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take prompt corrective action”).  
253. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998). 
254. Id. 
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otherwise to avoid harm. Alternatively, where the plaintiff has taken advantage 
of such measures, or where no policy exists, an employer should be able to 
avoid liability only if it has dissipated the taint of subordinate bias by 
undertaking a fair and independent investigation into the circumstances 
underlying the contemplated employment action.  
This recommendation provides several advantages. First, the affirmative 
defense would encourage employers to adopt explicit policies that prohibit bias 
in the workplace and facilitate employee complaints of biased treatment. 
Second, these employee complaints would provide a specific triggering 
mechanism for an employer to undertake an investigation. Third, the 
recommended framework would encourage employers to seek out and to deter 
potential adverse employment actions motivated by subordinate bias through a 
bias-conscious investigation.255 Fourth, the proposed defenses provide a means 
by which employers can protect themselves from litigation and from liability. 
Finally, the recommendations facilitate resolution by an internal mechanism that 
would be quicker, less costly, and less emotionally taxing than federal court 
litigation.  
Both employers and employees will likely criticize this proposal. 
Employees could argue that this framework would bar a number of suits by 
employees with otherwise meritorious claims simply because the employees in 
question do not utilize a formal complaint process. These critics could cite to 
experience in the harassment realm, pointing out that the vast majority of 
harassment victims are reluctant to file a formal complaint and, accordingly, are 
barred from legal recourse.256  
This criticism misses the mark for two reasons. First, an internal dispute 
resolution system like the one proposed will serve to deter many more 
inappropriate adverse employment actions than the handful of subordinate bias 
cases that make it to federal court each year. Second, victims of subordinate 
bias will be far more likely to utilize an internal reporting process than victims 
of harassment. The most common reason that employees do not make formal 
complaints of harassment is because they fear that reporting will invite 
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retaliation or otherwise make the situation worse.257 Employees who are on the 
brink of discharge due to subordinate bias will not have that same fear, but 
instead will see the reporting procedure as a last chance to save their jobs.  
Employers, however, are likely to criticize this proposal for just that reason; 
the internal reporting process will lead to an increase in the number of 
complaints—many unmeritorious—and add yet another layer of internal 
bureaucracy to the human resource function. Again, two responses are in order. 
First, the internal process itself quickly will weed out unmeritorious claims. 
Indeed, it will be quicker and cheaper to resolve these matters internally than in 
federal court. Second, such a process will provide more benefits than burdens 
for employers. The recommended process will pinpoint when independent 
investigations are needed and provide a mechanism by which employers can 
protect themselves from both litigation and liability. A few more complaints are 
a small price to pay for these resulting benefits.  
In sum, an employer’s independent investigation is an important third 
component in assessing the appropriateness of subordinate bias liability. Such 
investigations should be encouraged through the use of an affirmative defense 
and internal reporting procedure similar to those adopted by the Supreme Court 
for sexual harassment cases. Such investigations can serve the laudatory 
purposes of deterring discriminatory actions and reducing litigation, but only to 
the extent that they are fair, independent, and bias-conscious, so as to dissipate 
the otherwise motivating influence of subordinate bias under the circumstances.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The topic of subordinate bias liability is beset with layers of complexity. 
Some of the layers flow from the multiplicity of actors in such cases. 
Subordinate bias cases invariably implicate at least two actors: a biased 
subordinate—usually a lower level supervisor—and a higher ranked formal 
decisionmaker. But, it is not uncommon for additional actors to play roles in 
these cases, such as other supervisors and managers in a vertical hierarchy, or 
committee members who participate on a horizontal level.258 The possibility of 
an independent investigation offers the potential for yet another actor or team of 
actors. These many participants pose a daunting challenge for a court in 
determining the ultimate causal role of subordinate bias in the particular 
circumstances.  
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Subordinate bias liability also implicates layers of important policy issues. 
Concerns related to causation, agency principles, and the role of employer 
investigations serve as portals to many critical policy concerns. 
Finally, the appellate courts themselves have contributed to this layering 
effect by providing several layers of confusion. As this Article demonstrates, 
the circuit courts have adopted at least three different standards for determining 
subordinate bias liability. In actuality, far more than three viewpoints currently 
exist, as several gradations in approaches appear within the lenient and 
intermediate standards.  
A striking feature of the various liability standards is that each serves 
legitimate and substantial policy interests. The lenient standard legitimately 
recognizes that liability should be possible for subordinate liability that is 
causally linked to an adverse employment action. The strict standard 
legitimately recognizes that an employer should be vicariously liable only for 
the acts of its agents who have been empowered by delegated authority. The 
intermediate standard, meanwhile, legitimately recognizes the important role 
that employer investigations can play in furtherance of both discrimination 
deterrence and litigation avoidance goals. 
Given the positive underpinnings of all three standards, our proposed 
solution is not to choose one standard and one policy to the exclusion of the 
others, but to attempt an appropriate balance among all three approaches. With 
that goal in mind, our recommendations may be summarized as follows: 
(A) An employer may be liable under federal antidiscrimination 
statutes for the biased acts of a subordinate employee if 
(1) the employee acting with bias is a supervisor or otherwise acts 
in furtherance of authority delegated by the employer, and 
(2) the biased acts are a motivating factor in a resulting adverse 
employment action taken by the employer.  
(B) An employer, nonetheless, may avoid liability if it establishes a 
two-part affirmative defense showing that 
(1) it has taken reasonable measures to prevent and to correct such 
bias, such as by the implementation of a meaningful anti-bias 
policy, and  
(2) the plaintiff, unreasonably, has failed to take advantage of the 
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer 
or otherwise to avoid harm.  
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(C) Alternatively, where the plaintiff has taken advantage of such 
measures, or where the employer has not established an anti-bias 
policy, an employer may avoid liability if it has dissipated the taint of 
subordinate bias by undertaking a fair, independent, and bias-conscious 
investigation into the circumstances underlying the contemplated 
employment action. 
This set of recommendations provides a balanced, policy-based analytical 
framework for addressing the issue of subordinate bias liability. It represents the 
appropriate grasp of the cat’s paw theory. 
